




Volume 7 (2015), Issue X, #X 
 
 






Of all the people who came to prominence in the French Revolution, none has attracted as 
much attention as this one man, Maximilien Robespierre.  In the minds of many observers he 
is synonymous with the Revolution itself. His political principles were those of the radical 
revolution—liberty, equality, and the ‘rights of man’ for all men. As for his methods, he will 
be forever remembered as the man who linked ‘virtue’ with ‘terror’ in a speech made during 
the height of the recourse to terror, in February 1794, and the man who played a leading role 
in the notorious Law of Prairial in June 1794 that expedited the procedures of the 
Revolutionary Tribunal.
1
 Yet it was this same man who three years earlier, in late May 1791, 
had tried without success to get the death penalty abolished in the new constitution that the 
revolutionaries would give to France.  
 
The problem of Maximilien Robespierre—his choices, his motives, his integrity (or lack of 
it)—still generates intense controversy. For many commentators the politics, personality, and 
foibles of Robespierre himself are central to how we interpret the significance of the 
Revolution and, even more, the revolutionary terror of 1793 to 1794. By loading the blame 
on to Robespierre, making him ‘take the rap for the terror’, we avoid looking at more 
profound reasons, more troubling reasons, why terror developed. We can say it was all the 
fault of that unpleasant Robespierre, that Rousseauist, that paranoid man, that power-hungry 
dictator, that puritan obsessed with virtue—and forget that terror was in great part the 
consequence of a set of collective choices made by deputies of the National Convention. So 
much of the image of Robespierre as the man behind the Terror is invention and myth, begun 
by men who wanted to divert attention from their own involvement in terror, and elaborated, 
deepened and reified over the years into layer upon layer of myth—even to the latest, 
ridiculous story of the “death mask” and its supposedly scientific revelations.2 Do I think that 
Robespierre did terrible things in support of his vision of the Republic? Of course. Above all 
his part in the Law of Prairial. But that was not how he began, and the trajectory that he and 
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others took is my subject of my most recent book, Choosing Terror: Virtue, Friendship and 




I have spent many years now trying to work out the enigma that was Maximilien 
Robespierre.
4
  For me one of the most interesting things about the five years Robespierre 
spent at the centre of revolutionary politics is what they reveal about the experience of the 
Revolution. I take the view that we cannot understand Robespierre or his choices without 
understanding the politics of the Revolution: a politics that were constantly shifting and 
inherently unstable and that were characterised by conflicting ideas and emotions, fervent 
idealism, hope, loyalty, wild excitement, suspicion, fear, betrayal, and horror. To think that 
Robespierre—or any other revolutionary leader—mastered the Revolution is to vastly 
underestimate the sheer scale of the forces that the Revolution unleashed. The Revolution 
made Robespierre, and the Revolution destroyed him, just as it did so many others. 
 
Robespierre During the Early Stages of the Revolution 
 
The revolutionaries and would-be revolutionaries of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-
first centuries learned from the experience of France in 1789 that—given the right 
circumstances—revolution in their own time might be also possible. It was not like that for 
Robespierre. He was no Lenin, living on the margins of society, dodging the police, agitating 
for revolution, manoeuvring for power. We tend to view Robespierre’s life through the prism 
of the French Revolution and to forget that when it broke out he had already lived to mature 
adulthood in the world of the Old Regime. It was this milieu that shaped his attitudes and 
ideas. Robespierre’s intellectual formation was grounded in the currents of eighteenth-
century thought, above all the legal culture of the Old Regime, which he had studied and in 
which he made his career. Two recent studies which have added considerably to our 
understanding of Robespierre’s life before the Revolution are those by Peter McPhee and 
Hervé Leuwers.
5
 For Robespierre, as for many other revolutionaries, his conception of law 
would be fundamental to his political ideas.  
 
During the late 1780s, the period in which the political situation was rapidly deteriorating, 
largely through the actions—and inactions—of the monarchy and sections of the nobility, 
Robespierre was living an obscure and blameless life as a provincial lawyer, a respectable 
and, to outward observers at least, slightly dull existence. Like many of his contemporaries, 
he watched with wonder on the sidelines as the state teetered on the brink of a financial and 
political collapse. When Louis XVI called for elections to the Estates General, Robespierre 
seized his moment and won election as one of the 1,200 deputies. Here he was for a long time 
obscure, insignificant, and disregarded; he played no notable role in the Revolution of 1789 
that turned the Estates General into a National Assembly and transformed absolute monarchy 
into constitutional monarchy. 
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From the outset Robespierre was a radical democrat. He protested against the distinction that 
the Assembly made between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens, declaring that the rights of man 
should be for all, regardless of birth, regardless of wealth; he declaimed against slavery in the 
French colonies; he defended the civic rights of religious minorities; he opposed the death 
penalty; and he spoke passionately for liberty of the press. He was not one of the (admittedly 
very small) number of revolutionaries who argued that women should have a political voice, 
but before the Revolution he had supported the rights of women to participate in provincial 
academies—a progressive step for the time—and he regularly attracted a large number of 
women amongst his supporters in the galleries, much to the annoyance of his opponents.
6
 
What brought him to public notice was his dogged persistence; his refusal to change his 
views under pressure or enticements of wealth or position; and the way he lived his life 
according to his principles. He was seen as sincere: he could not be bought. It was in 1790 
that journalists in the Jacobin Club first started to call him ‘the Incorruptible’, a name that 
became fundamental to his political identity. The conservatives in the Assembly first ignored 
him and later ridiculed him. The leaders of his own side, the ‘triumvirs’, the Lameths, 
Barnave, and Duport, leading lights in the Jacobin Club, were friendly with him, but also 
condescending. They not unnaturally assumed that they themselves, men of the pre-
revolutionary social elite, would be the new leaders of the Revolution. 
 
Robespierre’s political principles owed much to the eighteenth-century idea of virtue, a word 
which, as I argued in an earlier book, had a range of derivations, mingling classical 
republicanism, natural virtue, religious thought, and the theme of self-sacrifice for the public 
good. To be politically virtuous meant that one was ready to put the public good before any 
other consideration. The concept of virtue had both political and emotional resonances: it 
recalled both the political formulations of Montesquieu and the emotional authenticity 
associated above all with Rousseau.
7
 There were always doubts about the authenticity of 
virtue; for how could one tell whether a public figure was truly virtuous, or whether he was 
speaking a rhetoric of public service in order to disguise his own ambition and corruption?
8
 
Yet despite these doubts, the belief that politicians should be virtuous became a key tenet of 
the Revolution from its earliest days, at a time well before Robespierre had any influence. 
Revolutionary politicians had to cultivate public opinion, play to the gallery, and establish 
their integrity in the eyes of their audiences. Their speeches, their actions and their conduct 
were subjected to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny, above all by the revolutionary 
press. In principle revolutionary leaders were supposed to be ready to put the public good 
before anything else, before their own self-interest, and before personal loyalties to friends 
and family; they ought to be devoid of personal ambition, egoism or the desire for glory, 
ready to sacrifice their own interests for the public good. The new men who came to the 
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forefront of political life were obliged to negotiate this changed cultural landscape in which 
their own ambition was considered as inherently suspicious, their true identity subject to 
public scrutiny. 
 
Robespierre’s reputation did not stem simply from the fact that he used the trope of ‘the man 
of virtue’, ready to sacrifice himself and all he held personally dear to the public good—as I 
showed in Choosing Terror many people did that. Robespierre’s real strength was that he 
spoke the language of virtue with utter conviction. Whilst Robespierre’s political categories 
derived above all from Montesquieu and the classical republican tradition, when he spoke 
about how he felt about virtue—which he so often did—he did so with sensibility, after the 
manner of Rousseau, which in turn gave him access to the aura of ‘true feelings’.9 Mirabeau 
is supposed to have said about Robespierre: ‘That man will go far, he believes what he says.’ 
Moreover Robespierre understood that words alone were not enough: there must be no gap 
between words and deeds. His manner of life—simple frugality and personal morality—bore 
witness to his sincerity. At different times in his career his numerous enemies tried to ‘dig the 
dirt’ about his private life, but the evidence they turned up was thin indeed. He had what 
came to count most in revolutionary politics—credibility. 10 
 
One person who recognized this aspect of Robespierre was William Augustus Miles, a spy 
for the British government who, ironically, was welcomed into the Jacobin Club. (Suspicion 
of foreigners came later, after the outbreak of war in 1792). What he saw in Robespierre was 
authenticity: 
 
He is cool, measured, and resolved. He is in his heart Republican, honestly so, 
not to pay court to the multitude, but from an opinion that it is the very best, if 
not the only form of government which men ought to admit. Upon this 
principle he acts, and the public voice is decidedly in favour of this system. … 
I watch him very closely every night. I read his countenance with eyes steadily 
fixed on him. He is really a character to be contemplated; he is growing every 
hour into consequence, and, strange to relate, the whole National Assembly 
hold him cheap, consider him as insignificant, and, when I mentioned to some 
of them my suspicions and said he would be the man of sway in a short time 




Authenticity was central to Robespierre’s political identity and to his eventual preeminence.12 
Yet his reputation was acquired over years during which he was regularly mocked by his 
                                                        
9
 On the emotional registers that Robespierre employed in his speeches, see David Andress, ‘Living the 
Revolutionary Melodrama: Robespierre’s Sensibility and the Construction of Political Commitment in the 
French Revolution’, Representations 114:1 (Spring 2011): 103-28. 
 
10
 Marisa Linton, ‘Robespierre et l'authenticité révolutionnaire’, Annales historiques de la Révolution française 
371 (janvier-mars 2013): 153-73. 
 
11
 Miles’s letter, written 1 March 1791, is cited in greater length in Linton, Choosing Terror, 86. 
 
12
 At the time I was writing Choosing Terror, contemporary politics in the United Kingdom was all about ‘spin’, 
‘soundbites’, and politicians who were more or less openly ambitious—and these were the politicians of the 
‘Left’. I watched all this with interest, both from a personal viewpoint and as a historian. I had long thought that 
as historians we tend to underestimate the overwhelmingly political nature of the French Revolution, and how 
revolutionary leaders operated, above all, as politicians. In some ways politicians may have a better insight into 




opponents and underestimated by leaders of his own group, the Jacobins. And all his 
authenticity and personal integrity would have amounted to nothing if men who were 
important figures and leaders in the first stages of the Revolution, men such as Lafayette, 
Mirabeau, d’Orléans, and the triumvirs, had not lost credit with revolutionary public opinion 
which became disillusioned with them for seeking to use their political influence to facilitate 
their personal ambitions and for employing a rhetoric of political virtue in which they did not 
appear to actually believe.  
 
Not even Robespierre’s most cynical detractors have said that he was corrupted by a desire 
for wealth. It has often been said, however, that he was corrupted by the desire to ‘get power’ 
and make himself a leader of the new political order. Two choices made by Robespierre call 
into question this characterization of him as a man who sought power for himself. The first of 
these was his successful proposal of a self-denying ordinance in May 1791. This provision, 
which blocked anyone who had been part of the National (Constituent) Assembly from 
entering the coming Legislative Assembly, had far-reaching consequences.
 
 Its principal 
tactical purpose was to block the ambitions of the triumvirs whose integrity Robespierre and 
the other radical Jacobins now doubted. At the same time, however, Robespierre was 
consciously sacrificing any ambitions he himself might have had to be a leader in the years to 
come. He was hardly to guess that within ten months the Legislative Assembly would plunge 
France into war and that, consequently, a second revolution, this time to overthrow the 
monarchy, would make France a Republic and bring into being a new assembly, the National 
Convention. It was as a member of the Convention that Robespierre would come to political 
power in circumstances he could not have foreseen in 1791.  
 
A second occasion when Robespierre publicly chose his beliefs over personal advantage and 
ambition was during the debates held in the Jacobin Club over the winter of 1791 to 1792 as 
to whether France should go to war with the foreign powers sheltering French émigrés. When 
Robespierre confronted Brissot, who was spear-heading the drive to war, he was putting his 
sense of what was right before political popularity, whilst other Jacobins, such as Danton, 
who had at first opposed the war, backed off when they saw which way the wind was 
blowing. The Brissotins played the patriotism card against Robespierre, saying that he was 
acting in bad faith in the pay of the court, a conspirator against the Revolution. One of 
Brissot’s supporters, Louvet denounced Robespierre on the floor of the Jacobins, saying that 
his stubborn opposition to war cloaked his ambition to achieve personal power: ‘You despair 
of the patrie, your doubts insult the nation …You are almost alone, and almost alone… you 
still hold in suspense the opinion of a great number of the people.’13 For some months 
Robespierre became a relatively isolated figure in the Jacobin Club as around him the popular 
patriotic and militarist enthusiasm intensified. It was only when the war, declared in spite of 
his efforts, went badly for France, that Robespierre regained his preeminence and indeed 
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consolidated it. He was able to say that he had warned that a war would be disastrous for 
France. 
 
Robespierre and Power 
 
Historians who have argued that Robespierre’s choices were about getting him power fail to 
appreciate how much of Robespierre’s career was about not being in power. What mattered 
to Robespierre far more than power was being in the right and being able to think of himself 
as being in the right. This characteristic did not always make him likeable—it fed his 
tendency to be self-righteous—as many of his detractors have noted. It was also one of the 
reasons why he saw his opponents as acting in bad faith, simply because they did not see 
things as he did—though to be fair this was a very common reaction in revolutionary politics 
and Robespierre was far from alone in taking this attitude, damaging as it was for the political 
process. But his determination to act according to his conscience was also his strength and a 
large part of the reason for his ascendancy. 
 
The transition from opposition to ruling group was a decisive moment for the leading 
Jacobins, not least Robespierre himself who had always been more at home criticising the 
shortcomings of others than being the man at the helm of the ship. Once Robespierre entered 
the Committee of Public Safety on 27 July 1793, his position was transformed. Being in 
power offered new opportunities for forging a successful career in revolutionary politics. In 
the summer of 1793 many members of the Jacobin Club, especially those who were also 
deputies (the Montagnards), expected to be rewarded for their devotion by material and 
career benefits. Robespierre entered power with considerable caution. He understood the 
importance of how a revolutionary politician lived. Since he was in the service of the public 
he had to be accessible to the public. He did not live secluded behind the high walls of a 
palace, did not have a bodyguard, and did not keep a carriage. He ate frugally (again, this 
came naturally to him) and was wary of dinner invitations to expensive restaurants.
14
 In the 
Year II this demonstration of modest living and accessibility was expected of the 
Revolution’s leaders, even if, as a consequence, they risked their lives and were vulnerable to 
assassination by the people who hated them—and there were many of these. The 
assassination of the Montagnard deputies Lepeletier (in a restaurant) and Marat (in his 
bathtub), along with further attempted assassinations (both directed against Robespierre) in 
May 1794, must have added considerably to the revolutionary leaders’ state of tension.15 
 
A central part of Choosing Terror addresses the growing climate of fear which haunted the 
revolutionary leaders, including Robespierre. Much of this fear was about their fellow 
revolutionaries: the revolutionary leaders feared the royalists and their enemies on the 
battlefields, but they also feared men who were on their own side. I described this as the 
‘politicians’ terror’. This was the terror that revolutionary leaders meted out to one another. 
In some ways it paralleled the wider Terror but it also had particular characteristics of its 
own. The revolutionary leaders were themselves ‘subject to terror’. This took two forms. 
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First, revolutionary leaders were liable to arrest under the laws that enabled terror, as 
successive laws removed their parliamentary immunity and criminalised the ‘wrong’ political 
opinions. Second, they were subject to the emotion of terror. Fears that they could not openly 
acknowledge—because innocence was meant to be fearless and fear was a sign of 
consciousness of guilt—increased in intensity, above all during the critical period between 
March 1793 and July 1794. The revolutionary leaders’ growing consciousness of the danger 
in which they stood undoubtedly influenced their decisions, even though they were constantly 
insisting—in public at least—that they did not let it affect them. Ironically, leaders had much 
more cause to fear the Terror than most of the Parisian population. A high proportion of the 
leaders of the Revolution (above all those who either were or had been members of the 
Jacobin Club) died violent deaths, either under the guillotine or by their own hand. The 
politicians’ terror climaxed in a series of trials and executions of revolutionary leaders during 
the Year II: the Girondins, the Hébertists/Cordeliers, the Dantonists, and—executed without 
any form of trial beyond identification before the Revolutionary Tribunal—the 
Robespierrists. These successive factions were accused of being ‘conspirators’, whose 
professed virtue and love of the patrie concealed the fact that they were financially and 
politically corrupt, had sold themselves to the royalists and the foreign powers, and were part 




Thermidor and the Fall of Robespierre 
 
It is two hundred and twenty-one years now since Robespierre fell in the political coup that 
became known as Thermidor after the revolutionary month in which it took place. His fall, 
when it came, happened with dizzying speed; he went from leader, to ‘conspirator’, to 
outlaw, to condemned traitor in the space of thirty hours. The coup brought about the deaths 
of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and 106 others over three days on 10, 11, and 12 Thermidor. The 
reasons behind the coup are still subject to debate. The traditional view of Robespierre in the 
weeks leading up to Thermidor is that he was operating a deliberate strategy to retain and 
extend his grip on power. This is a view that owes much to the Thermidorean accounts of 
Robespierre as a dictator, motivated by ambition, greed, and the lust for power. The 
allegation that Robespierre was a ‘dictator’ was already being made about him in the weeks 
before Thermidor. During the course of the long, involved speech which he made to the 
Convention on 8 Thermidor, after several weeks of his non-attendance there, he protested 
against this portrayal of himself, insisting repeatedly on his identity as a man of virtue. Whilst 
the rhetoric was familiar, tactically the speech represented a key change for it was the first 
time since he had entered the Committee of Public Safety that he had addressed the 
Convention not as a Committee member, but as an individual, thus staking everything on the 
deputies’ belief in his personal integrity. Simultaneously he denounced a number of 
Montagnards whom he thought of as conspiring against the Revolution and against himself –
in his mind the two categories had become one. Yet he refused to reveal their names, 
terrifying many of the Montagnards who thought that he might have them in mind and, thus, 
laying the ground for the very conspiracy that he feared—the conspiracy for his opponents to 
destroy him before he could destroy them. His decision to make this speech was, by any 
assessment, an irrational act of which even his own friends seem to have disapproved.  
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Robespierre was confronted by an ideological dilemma. If he had tried to organise his 
supporters to resist his enemies amongst the Montagnards he would have been, by his own 
standards maintained over five years of revolutionary conflict, engaging in a conspiracy. It is 
evident that maintaining his authenticity as a man of virtue mattered to him more than 
anything else at that moment—even more than staying alive. His final words in the 
Convention on 8 Thermidor, after the deputies had declined to endorse his speech by ordering 
it to be printed, were to reassert his identity as a man who acted alone, not as the leader of a 
faction: ‘I do not desire the support, nor the friendship of anyone; I do not seek to form a 
party … I have done my duty, it is for others to do theirs.’17 Robespierre had been predicting 
his own death since the start of the Revolution. The assassination attempts against him had 
shaken him badly. Now he felt death closing in on him. In the Jacobins that night, he read the 
speech again, before an emotional audience, declaring it to be his ‘testament of death’. Two 
of his opponents on the Committee of Public Safety, Collot d’Herbois and Billaud-Varenne 
were driven out of the Jacobin Club amidst shouts of ‘To the guillotine!’ leaving them in no 
doubt that either they—or Robespierre—were about to die and, therefore, bent on killing him. 
Yet at the end of that evening, Robespierre went home to the Duplays’ house where he 
lodged, leaving his opponents free to organise their defence, born of terror for their own 
lives, to destroy Robespierre before he could destroy them. If this was Robespierre’s plan to 
launch a conspiracy to purge the Committees he made a singularly poor show of it. It is not 
even clear that he conferred with Saint-Just— the man entrusted with the key speech to show 
that Robespierre and the Committees had patched up their differences. In the speech Saint-
Just intended to give the next day, and which he was rewriting on the night of 8 Thermidor, 
he chose to be loyal to Robespierre, even whilst he referred to Robespierre’s confused state 
of mind: ‘… to be honest, he [Robespierre] by no means explained himself clearly enough, 
but his isolation and his bitterness of heart may give him some excuse; he understands 
nothing of the reasons for his persecution; he knows only his misery’.18  
 
Much about what happened in Thermidor makes little sense unless we appreciate how far 
events were driven by virulent emotions, above all suspicion, intense anxiety—and despair. 
There is ample evidence that in the run-up to Thermidor, the political leaders were suffering 
from stress, exhaustion—and fear. It is hardly surprising, to my mind, that in those 
circumstances deputies were sleepless, suspicious, tense, and made decisions they would not 
have done in normal circumstances. They knew that the politicians’ terror could rebound 
upon their own heads. They did not have immunity from arrest. Robespierre was no 
exception; his place at the centre of revolutionary politics did not give him immunity, 
something of which he was well aware, for he himself had used the principle of no special 
privilege for national representatives to argue that there should be no immunity for the 
Dantonists; how then could he expect his own position to be different? His emotional and 
psychological strain was exacerbated by bouts of physical ill health—a subject on which 
McPhee has presented the clearest evidence yet. Without detailed medical reports we cannot 
be sure of the extent of his illness, but whilst it is likely that physical illness was exacerbated 
by his stressed state of mind, it is evident that mental anguish was what affected him the 
most. In this he was not alone; an atmosphere of dread permeated the Convention in the 
summer of 1794.  
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For some of the time that I was writing Choosing Terror I felt as though I was walking down 
a road alone as I explored the intense emotions—acknowledged and unacknowledged—and 
the fraught atmosphere generated within the Convention. But even in the two years since my 
book’s publication, it has been exciting to me to see that other historians, including Timothy 
Tackett and Michel Biard, both of whom have spent a lifetime researching the Revolution, 
have been exploring parallel themes, working to uncover the very real dangers that 
revolutionary politicians ran and asking how the constant tension in which the deputies lived 




Surprisingly, one dissenting voice is that of Colin Jones. Much of Jones’ long and 
distinguished career has been devoted to social and medical history—particularly that of 
dentistry—and he has only lately turned to the study of revolutionary politics during the 
Terror. Jones explicitly rejects the idea that Robespierre was either physically or emotionally 
unwell in July 1794 and dismisses my own work, along with that of McPhee and Tackett as 
taking what Jones characterises as ‘the poor little Maxie’ approach.20 His own view of 
Robespierre’s Thermidor speech is that Robespierre was simply employing a ‘trope of self-
sacrificial virtue’ as he had done on previous occasions. The dynamics were far more 
complex than that. My work (as well as that of McPhee and Tackett) deserves a rather more 
attentive reading than Jones appears to have given it. Far from singling out Robespierre in 
isolation, Choosing Terror investigates a whole group of people and their individual and 
collective experiences of revolutionary politics. The revolutionary leaders were complex—as 
complex as we are ourselves—and to understand them and their choices we need to see them 
in three-dimensional terms and to reconstruct not just the rhetoric they used but also their 
ideological beliefs, their tactics, their emotions, and the complex relationship between their 
personal lives and public identities.  
 
After Robespierre’s death the problem of his authentic identity became part of a battlefield 
over the legitimacy of the Revolution and even of the morality of the recourse to terror. The 
fabrication of the myth of Robespierre, which began with the Thermidoreans, is as integral to 
how the present generation sees the ‘Robespierre problem’ as was the historical reality of his 
life.
21
 Despite the continued attempts of historians to explain Robespierre’s actual role in the 
Revolution, the myth that he was the mastermind behind the Terror and the dictator of France 
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proves more resilient than the historical reality. I have lost count of the number of times that 
people have happily assured me that Robespierre is easy to understand, ‘he was just like 
Stalin really’; to which I reply, ‘He was much more complicated than that. The Revolution 
was much more complicated than that. Robespierre never held the individual power that 
Stalin had, and he was nothing like as ruthless. If he’d been a Stalin he would have acted first 
to ensure his enemies were killed and he would have been the victor in Thermidor’. For me, it 
is the very fact that Robespierre acted as he did in Thermidor that keeps him interesting, that 
keeps him human, and not the monster of legend.  
 
So what had happened to the idealistic young man who starts out full of hope for a better 
world in 1789, who tries to get the death penalty abolished in 1791, who sacrifices his 
personal political ambitions with the self-denying ordinance, who speaks out bravely against 
Brissot’s reckless and irresponsible plan to wage war in Europe with the ringing words ‘no 
one welcomes armed liberators’, but who goes on to become an apologist for terror, the man 
who puts his signature to the arrest of his friend, Camille Desmoulins, who backs the Law of 
Prairial? The answer to why a man like Robespierre, an idealist and a humanitarian in 1789, 
chose terror in 1793 lies, not in some warp of his personality, but in the shifting, unstable, 
and shattering politics of the Revolution. So, if you want to figure out Robespierre, first 
figure out the Revolution. Admittedly, it may take you a lifetime, but the best history writing 
does take that long, and some of the best historians of both Robespierre and the Revolution, 
such as Georges Lefebvre, J. M. Thompson, Norman Hampson, and so many others, did just 
that, and in the process, they told us about the Revolution, told us about Robespierre – and 




As I said at the start of Choosing Terror to understand the French revolutionaries is to better 
understand ourselves. How can we know what we ourselves might be capable of in such 
circumstances? If we want to understand why people acted and thought as they did in the 
past, often in extreme circumstances, then as historians there is no room for complacency. 
We have cause to be grateful that we have not been confronted with such choices, in such 
circumstances, and with such tragic consequences as they faced in their own lives. Would we 
have held onto our humanity, our courage, our loyalty towards our friends? How distant is 
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